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Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law in the context of non-execution of a 
European Arrest Warrant 
 






The formal reference to the rule of law in the Treaty (Article 2 TEU) applies to all EU 
areas of action and is applicable to both Member States and their citizens. Such 
attachment to the rule of law reinforces the axiom established in the early case law of 
the CJEU that EU law imposes obligations on individuals and confers upon them 
substantive rights which constitute an essential part of their legal heritage.2 As such, 
upholding the rule of law via rigorous monitoring of the general principles of EU law 
constitutes a central tenet of the jurisprudence of the CJEU.3 More recently, the CJEU 
has employed the general principles of EU law in order to uphold concepts such as 
judicial independence which is protected, inter alia, through freedom of judges from 
interference and influence or pressure from the State, including restrictions on 
removal from office. The CJEU has established a firm link between judicial 
independence and the fundamental right to effective judicial review to ensure 
compliance with EU law in the Member States as one of the cornerstones of the rule 
of law.4  
 
This contribution will provide an analysis of the much anticipated judgment in 
Minister for Justice and Equality v LM (LM hereafter),5 a preliminary ruling which 
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confirms the above commitments in the context of non-execution of a European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW) – the well-known but still somewhat controversial cross-
border judicial surrender procedure.6 The question referred to the CJEU was whether 
an Irish judge shall refrain from surrendering a criminal suspect detained in Ireland 
under a EAW issued against him by Poland when the latter State is undermining the 
principle of judicial independence upon which the rule of law depends.7 In the case at 
hand, it was contended that Poland jeopardised the principle of judicial independence 
through its recent reforms of the judiciary system that gave the government greater 
powers over the country’s judiciary. It was also alleged that such reforms would have 
a detrimental effect to the kind of judicial review afforded to a person surrendered to 
Poland.  
 
Although the Irish reference relates only to the execution of the EAW, the case raised 
a number of broader legal questions regarding the linkage between the right to a fair 
trial under Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental rights; the requirement in 
Article 19(1) TEU for an independent judiciary as the provider of effective remedies, 
and the protection of the overarching principle of the rule of law enshrined in Article 
2 TEU. The reasoning of the CJEU in LM was key in linking the above provisions. 
Inter alia the CJEU elucidated the test that can be applied by national courts to assess 
systemic deficiencies that may put individuals at risk in one of the Member States and 
therefore refrain from giving effect to a EAW beyond the listed cases of non-
execution provided by the Framework Decision. The judgment also reaffirmed the 
interrelation between the right to effective judicial protection, judicial independence 
and the rule of law and allowed the CJEU to draw red lines regarding the protection 
of European values.8  
 
2. Factual and legal background to the dispute 
 
LM concerns a preliminary reference made to the CJEU by the Irish High Court. The 
question addressed to the CJEU concerned the enforcement of a European Arrest 
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Warrant (EAW) against Artur Celmer, a 31-year-old Polish national, accused in 
Poland for drug trafficking offences. Celmer, who was detained in Ireland, refused to 
surrender to the Polish authorities because of the potential breach of his right to a fair 
trial (within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR and Article 47 EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights). He claimed, in particular, that recent legislative reforms in 
Poland of the justice system posed a grave risk of denial of justice and the rule of law.  
 
Henceforth, Ms Justice Donnelly of the Irish High Court asked the CJEU to clarify 
the test required to be applied by a national judge in order to assess an individual’s 
objection to surrender to another Member State when there is strong evidence that the 
justice system in that issuing Member State is no longer operating under the rule of 
law. Specifically, the Irish judge queried whether the CJEU’s Aranyosi and Căldăraru 
two-stage test (regarding non-execution of a EAW on account of cruel detention 
conditions in Hungary and Romania respectively) is applicable in the Polish context. 9  
 
The Aranyosi and Căldăraru test - often described as a step to soften the relationship 
between the CJEU and the ECtHR, following Opinion 2/13 10  - provided that 
postponement of a EAW is possible where fundamental rights are at stake, especially 
when the executing judicial authority finds: 
 
i) that there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the issuing 
Member State on account, inter alia, of systemic deficiencies.  
and 
ii) that there are substantial grounds for believing that the individual 
concerned by the EAW will be exposed to such a risk.  
                                                 
9
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Accepted version of forthcoming article in the CMLR – please do not cite without my permission 4
 
It follows that if the CJEU required that the above test is applicable in LM it would 
have been possible for the Irish High Court to make an individual assessment of the 
specific situation of the concerned individual. What is more, allowing the Irish High 
Court to make an individual assessment and subsequent finding of incompatibility of 
the surrender of an individual on the above grounds would have been compatible with 
section 37(1) of the Irish European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 according to which 
Ireland can refuse to execute a EAW if it breaches Ireland’s obligations under the 
ECHR.11   
 
The LM reference for a preliminary ruling was very well-timed in that beyond its 
immediate aim in seeking guarantees from the CJEU that the rights of the accused 
will be protected, it also confronted the attempts of the Polish government to place the 
judicial system under the control of the executive and legislative branches. As it is 
well known, the independence of the judiciary in Poland has been subject to 
considerable political controversy and tension between the Commission and the 
Polish authorities since 2016. This is, inter alia, due to the adoption of legislation in 
Poland pertaining to the reform of the Supreme Court and the National Council of the 
Judiciary.12 For instance, the lowering of the Supreme Court retirement age from 
seventy to sixty-five had the effect of terminating the mandate of approximately 40 
percent of Supreme Court judges before the end of their legal terms. As such, it 
jeopardised the principles of irremovability of judges and of judicial independence 
and infringed Poland’s obligation to ensure effective legal protection in the areas 
covered by EU law. 
 
Despite repeated efforts to engage the Polish authorities in a constructive dialogue, 
including in the context of its 2014 ‘Rule of Law Framework’ (Article 7 TEU), the 
Commission concluded in 2016 that there was a clear risk of a serious breach of the 
rule of law in Poland.13 In 2017, the Polish authorities were served with a  ‘Reasoned 
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proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) of the TEU regarding the rule of law in 
Poland’ which supported the case of existing systemic deficiencies in Poland and 
highlighted the clear risk of a serious breach of the values referred to in Article 2 
TEU. 14  Subsequently, outside the contours of the Article 7 TEU process, in 
September 2018, the Commission referred Poland to the CJEU contending that Polish 
legislation on the Supreme Court was in breach of the principle of judicial 
independence.15 The Commission also asked the CJEU to order interim measures 
until it had issued a judgment on the case. Indeed, by order of the Court on 17 
December 2018, Poland was requested to immediately suspend the application of the 
provisions of national legislation relating to the lowering of the retirement age for 
Supreme Court judges.16 As a result, the Polish Parliament passed legislation on the 
same day to reinstate Supreme Court judges who were forced to retire.17 
 
Against this factual and legal background (but for the recent order of the CJEU 
regarding judges’ retirement), it can be contended that the accused in LM had 
substantial evidence at his disposal to challenge his extradition from Ireland to 
Poland. Beyond the European Commission’s reasoned proposal, the Opinion of the 
Venice Commission also constituted further ammunition to highlight the lack of 
independent and legitimate constitutional review and the existing threats to the 
independence of the ordinary judiciary in Poland.18 The latter claims made by an 
impartial body outside the EU framework underlined further the risk to an individual 
finding him/herself entangled in the Polish justice system. 
 
3. Opinion of the Advocate General 
 
Advocate General Tanchev opined that the maintenance of independence of courts, 
including their composition, is the foundation of the right to a fair trial. He stressed 
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that independence and impartiality require rules in place in relation to the composition 
of the body and the appointment and dismissal of its members. Accordingly, he 
echoed the Commission’s reasoned proposal to the Council to adopt a decision 
against Poland under Article 7(1) TEU which established that the independence of the 
judiciary is a key component of the rule of law.19 The Advocate General underlined 
that: 
 
It cannot, to my mind, be ruled out that lack of independence of the courts 
of the issuing Member State may, in principle, constitute a flagrant denial 
of justice.20 
 
The Advocate General agreed that the fact that there is a problem pertaining to 
judicial independence in a Member State is indeed concerning vis-à-vis the (mutual 
recognition) presumption of equivalent protection of fundamental rights in all 
Member States. However, he claimed that such a problem at the heart of a Member 
State is not sufficient in its own to establish that surrendering a criminal suspect 
pursuant to a EAW issued by that Member State would expose her/him to a ‘risk of 
flagrant denial of justice’. 21 Instead, the Advocate General submitted that the lack of 
independence and impartiality of a tribunal equals to a flagrant denial of justice only 
when it is so serious that it destroys the fairness of the trial enshrined in Article 47 (2) 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.22 He confirmed, in accordance with the 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru test, that the non-execution of EAWs is also based on an 
individual assessment.  
 
Accordingly, the Irish High Court needed to determine that the seriousness of the 
alleged lack of independence of the Polish courts amounted to destruction of the 
fairness of the trial. To the assistance of the Irish judge, the Advocate General 
highlighted that in building her case about whether Celmer could get a fair trial in 
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 Reasoned Proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU regarding the rule of law in Poland, 
20.12.2017. COM (2017) 835 final, p.36 
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 Ibid, para 93. See also Advocate General Sharpston in Case 396/11 Radu ECLI:EU:C:2012:648, para 
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Poland, Ms Justice Donnelly needed to rely upon objective, reliable, specific and 
properly updated information. Such information included the Commission’s reasoned 
proposal about Poland and any progress made by the Polish authorities thereafter.  
 
4. Judgment of the Court 
 
The case was given expedited status by the CJEU (since Mr Celmer was in custody) 
and was heard on 1 June 2018 by the Grand Chamber, which demonstrates the 
importance to ensuring effectiveness of judicial cooperation and the protection of 
fundamental rights as well as the necessity for addressing systemic rule of law 
problems in Poland. The CJEU’s judgment was unequivocal and clearly mandated 
that maintaining the independence of judicial authorities is essential in order to ensure 
the effective judicial protection of individuals, including in the context of the EAW 
mechanism.23 The CJEU also confirmed the centrality of adherence to fundamental 
EU values by Member States, such as respect to the rule of law and mutual trust. 
 
The CJEU tackled the issue of judicial independence from the point of view of the 
protection of the criminal suspect. It treated the principle of judicial independence as 
a determining aspect of Mr Clemer’s right to a fair trial protected by Article 47 of the 
Charter and also linked to Article 1(3) of the EAW Framework Decision. The latter 
provides that the EAW Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying 
the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as 
enshrined in Articles 2 and 6 TEU.24  
 
In line with the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test, the CJEU stressed that in the event the 
executing court possessed information that there is a real risk of breach of the right to 
fair trial because of systemic or generalised deficiencies vis-à-vis the independence of 
the issuing State’s judiciary, it shall assess whether the accused incurs such a risk if 
she is surrendered to that State. Like the Advocate General’s Opinion, the CJEU 
judgment placed the onus on national courts: It confirmed that the violation of 
fundamental rights protected by EU law can trigger an individual assessment by an 
executing judicial authority of the situation in their counterpart.  
                                                 
23
 LM judgment, paras 48, 63, 65. 
24
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When it came to the provision of guidance to a national court making an individual 
assessment about the execution of a EAW, the CJEU did not refer to the Advocate 
General’s ‘real risk of flagrant denial of justice’ benchmark (although the same term 
was also used by the Irish High Court in its preliminary reference) which was broad 
and would have perhaps set the bar higher for the national judge. Instead the CJEU 
used the more familiar term ‘real risk of breach of fundamental rights’ as an aid to a 
national court making an individual assessment. 25  Despite such semantics, the 
threshold set by the CJEU in LM on the prevention of surrender is very high. The 
CJEU established that the executing court needed to have regard of the requirements 
of independence and impartiality in the issuing state (e.g. rules pertaining to the 
courts’ composition; length of service; grounds of abstention, rejection and 
disciplinary procedures in place as well as dismissal of judges) in order to assess 
whether in the circumstances of the case at hand there are substantial grounds to 
believe that there is a real risk of breach of fundamental rights and that the accused 
will be exposed to that risk.  
 
The CJEU noted that in its individual assessment, the Irish High Court could rely on 
the Commission’s rule-of-law probe against Poland vis-à-vis the latter’s breach of the 
values inherent in Article 2 TEU. The deficiencies concerning the independence of 
the issuing Polish courts included the lack of an independent constitutional review 
                                                 
25
 Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru [2016] EU:C:2016:198, paras 91, 94, 
98. As already mentioned the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test confirms that postponement of the 
execution of a EAW can only take place where the requested person can demonstrate that i) there is a 
real risk of flagrant denial of justice on account of deficiencies affecting the system of justice of the 
issuing Member State and ii) that s/he will be exposed to that risk. Adopting the ‘flagrant denial of 
justice’ terminology used by the Irish High Court in its preliminary reference (see LM judgment, para 
25), the Advocate General stressed (in para 72) that ‘in order for the execution of a European arrest 
warrant to have to be postponed, it is not sufficient that there is a real risk of breach of the second 
paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter in the issuing Member State. There must be a real risk of flagrant 
denial of justice.’ There is a lot of emphasis on the ECtHR case law in the Opinion using the ‘flagrant 
denial’ test as applied in relation to Article 6 ECHR (see paras 80-83 of the AG Opinion). Conversely, 
the CJEU stayed loyal to its Aranyosi and Căldăraru terminology highlighting that what matters is that 
‘the existence of a real risk that the person in respect of whom a European arrest warrant has been 
issued will, if surrendered to the issuing judicial authority, suffer a breach of his fundamental right to 
an independent tribunal and, therefore, of the essence of his fundamental right to a fair trial, a right 
guaranteed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter…’ Following the CJEU’s preliminary 
ruling, the Irish judge attempted to clarify these two interpretations by pointing that: ‘The case law 
emanating from the ECtHR as to the test being one of a flagrant denial of justice is well settled and it 
must be understood on the basis that the CJEU took that that aspect of the law as settled. Therefore, the 
essence of the right and the flagrant denial of the right are to be understood as one and the same.’ See 
Minister for Justice and Equality v Celmer No 5 [2018] IEHC 639, para 24. 
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and the absence of independence of the ordinary judiciary deriving from recent 
reform legislation. Ireland could, therefore, temporarily refrain (by way of exception) 
from executing the EAW in this case.26 While this is true, the CJEU clarified that 
systemic and generalised deficiencies in the independence of the judiciary in Poland 
are not sufficient of themselves to amount to a real risk of Mr Celmer’s right to a fair 
trial. The conclusion is that an individual risk test is always required to be undertaken 
by executing courts 
 
5. Four important aspects of the LM judgment 
 
The focus here is on four aspects where the ruling in LM makes a particular 
contribution: (A) the application of the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test in LM. The test 
relies upon principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition, and was designed to 
guide the control exercised by national courts on the execution of EAWs; (B) striking 
the balance between effectiveness of mutual recognition (a structural principle) and 
fundamental rights protection (a substantive principle); (C) establishing rules 
regarding the protection afforded to individuals in accordance with the principles of 
judicial independence and impartiality as general principles of EU law; and (D) 
protecting the rule of law in the EU as a foundational and overarching principle that 
encompasses general principles of EU law. 
 
A. The Aranyosi and Căldăraru test 
 
A distinction shall be drawn between a national court making an individual 
assessment (asking whether the particular suspect is at risk) to a national court making 
a general assessment (asking if everyone extradited to a defaulting Member State 
would face risks). It is clear that in LM only the first question was asked (and 
answered) – i.e. whether Mr Celmer is at risk. LM is, therefore, more of a fair trial 
case than one that concerns rule of law deficiencies in Poland and whether Member 
States shall generally refuse to extradite suspects as a result of those deficiencies. As 
such, the CJEU was right to apply its Aranyosi and Căldăraru test (thus acting more 
as a fundamental rights court) while abstaining from providing general guidance or a 
                                                 
26
 Having said that, we shall remind the reader that the CJEU maintains the position that refusal to 
execute a EAW is an exception to the principle of mutual recognition underlying the EAW mechanism 
and that exception must accordingly be interpreted strictly.  
Accepted version of forthcoming article in the CMLR – please do not cite without my permission 10
free pass to external rule-of-law scrutiny of the Polish government’s backsliding by 
fellow national courts or otherwise (thus acting less as a constitutional court). In 
doing so, however, the CJEU made the standard for not granting an extradition 
request very high indeed. 
 
In striking a balance between effectiveness of judicial cooperation and the protection 
of fundamental rights, the CJEU emphasised that Member States may only ‘in 
exceptional cases’ check whether another Member State has actually, in a specific 
case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law.27 The CJEU did not 
conduct a general assessment on Poland’s breach of the obligation to ensure 
independence of the courts. Neither did it propose a drastic solution about the 
execution of all pending EAWs issued by Polish courts. This is because, as has been 
noted elsewhere, ‘there is a substantial difference between fundamental rights and the 
independence of judiciary. Infringements of the latter require other legal mechanisms 
of protection’ namely Article 7 TEU. 28 Instead, the CJEU proposed a case-by-case 
assessment requiring all executing courts to apply the two-tier Aranyosi and 
Căldăraru test for blocking the execution of EAWs. In this respect, the CJEU 
contributed to the precedential value attributed by the Court itself to its previous 
judgments and their binding effect on national courts. 29 It also avoided confrontation 
between the political process of Article 7 TEU and the role of the CJEU. While 
emphasising the close connection between fundamental rights and judicial 
independence, the CJEU decided to focus on the individual situation in LM. Let us 
now turn to the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test for not granting an extradition request 
and articulate the key ideas in the two limbs studied, as well as their limitations.  
 
i) existence of systemic or generalised deficiencies 
 
With regard to the existence of systemic or generalised deficiencies, the CJEU held 
that the executing court must build its case on a basis of material that is objective, 
                                                 
27
 LM judgment, para 43. 
28
 A Frąckowiak-Adamska, ‘Drawing Red Lines With No (Significant) Bite – Why an Individual Test 
Is Not Appropriate in the LM Case’, VerfBlog,2018/7/30, https://verfassungsblog.de/drawing-red-
lines-with-no-significant-bite-why-an-individual-test-is-not-appropriate-in-the-lm-case/ 
29
 See T Tridimas, ‘Precedent and the Court of Justice: A Jurisprudence of Doubt’ in J Dickson and P 
Eleftheriadis, Philosophical Foundations of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), p.307. 
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reliable, specific and properly updated. The Court noted that beyond the 
Commission’s reasoned proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU, an important 
factor for the executing court in assessing the deficiency in question is the extent to 
which there is evidence of new national legislation that includes a remedy mechanism 
with regard to guaranteeing the right(s) in question. Although it was claimed by the 
CJEU that such legislation shall be effective (as opposed to merely symbolic) 
considering an extradition against the background of such evidence may not be 
always possible. This is the case when, for instance, evidence of new legislation can 
only be drawn from the information provided to the executing court by the national 
authorities of the defaulting Member State.  
 
The CJEU’s judgment in Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (decided in the same year as LM) 
in relation to conditions of detention in Hungary is helpful in this regard. It provides 
that information which is ‘objective, reliable, specific and properly updated’ may also 
be obtained from ‘judgments of international courts, such as judgments of the ECtHR, 
judgments of courts of the issuing Member State, and also decisions, reports and 
other documents produced by bodies of the Council of Europe or under the aegis of 
the UN.’ 30  This addition to the first limb of the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test 
demonstrates synergy between different rule-of-law stakeholders at all levels. It also 
provides substantial resources for national judges called to conducting an individual 
assessment and a concrete inquiry prior to blocking the execution of a EAW.  
 
On the downside, the CJEU’s instructions in Generalstaatsanwaltschaft about the 
pool of evidence available regarding systemic or generalised deficiencies imply that 
whoever is in risk of being extradited must rely heavily on the availability of external 
resources as evidence that can be used in court. It may be relatively easy to find such 
material now as everyone’s attention is on rule of law deficiencies in Poland and 
Hungary. But will this rule-of-law monitoring continue for as long as these 
                                                 
30
 Case C-220/18 PPU Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (2018) ECLI:EU:C:2018:589, para 45. The CJEU 
continues in paras 47-48: ‘That was the view taken, first, by the ECtHR, which held that the new 
measures are not a dead letter and that instead they furnish an effective guarantee of the right not to be 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment.  Second, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, in its decision of June 2017, welcomed the Hungarian authorities’ commitment to resolve the 
problem of prison overcrowding and noted that the measures already taken appeared to have produced 
their first results and that it was to be hoped that those measures, and others that might be adopted in 
the future, might help the Hungarian authorities in taking, on a case-by-case basis, concrete and 
effective actions to further tackle that problem.’  
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deficiencies are in place or will the focus of EU institutions, bodies of the Council of 
Europe, and the UN, turn somewhere else tomorrow leaving behind only outdated 
material? 
 
It has been argued that the possible impact of the LM ruling is ‘colossal’ and could 
potentially exceed that of the Aranyosi and Căldăraru decision.31 Indeed, handling 
national judges the keys to conduct a review of the jurisdiction of their European 
counterparts where a comprehensive violation of the rule of law is at issue is not a 
trivial matter. It provides national courts with a means of unilaterally enforcing 
justiciable rights within the permissible limits determined by EU law. While doing so, 
however, we cannot ignore the fact that this new competence carries the danger of 
reducing horizontal judicial cooperation based on mutual recognition. On the one 
hand, some issuing courts may be less likely than others to engage in a constructive 
dialogue with their counterparts. On the other hand, some executing courts may find it 
difficult to make sense of the CJEU’s guidance in LM and take too narrow an 
approach to establishing systemic or generalised deficiencies.  
 
ii) A risk of fundamental rights breach 
 
The CJEU established that the executing judicial authority must assess whether, 
having regard to Mr Celmer’s personal situation, as well as to the nature of the 
offence for which he was prosecuted and the factual context that formed the basis of 
the EAW, there were substantial grounds for believing that following his surrender he 
would run a real risk of breach of his fundamental right to an independent tribunal 
and, therefore, of the essence of his fundamental right to a fair trial. This individual 
assessment, which is always required to be performed in order to ascertain whether 
the threshold for refusal of surrender has been reached, was more recently revisited in 
Generalstaatsanwaltschaft.32 It was held that the executing judicial authority must 
assess solely the actual and precise conditions of detention of the person concerned 
that are relevant for determining whether that person concerned will be exposed to a 
                                                 
31
 Guest Editorial, (2018) CMLR, p993. The author also mentions that LM goes also beyond the N.S. 
decision (mentioned later in the annotation). 
32
 Case C-220/18 PPU Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (2018) ECLI:EU:C:2018:589. 
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real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
 
The CJEU established that an individual assessment was also necessary even where 
the issuing Member State has been the subject of a reasoned proposal of the 
Commission seeking a determination by the Council that there is a clear risk of a 
serious breach by that Member State of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU. The 
above assessment may seem time-consuming, yet it is compatible with the Treaty 
which (as mentioned above) does not confer competence to the Commission to make 
a finding about a clear breach of the rule of law. To suggest that the Commission’s 
rule of law probe sufficed to automatically authorise a halt to a EAW request from 
Poland could be perceived as encroachment on the competences of the European 
Council. 33  Additionally, the CJEU confirmed that executing courts are bound to 
undertake an individual assessment of the situation of each person concerned even in 
the event the competent authority of the issuing Member State provides assurances by 
means of which a commitment is given that the person sought will not have her rights 
violated.34  
 
The above guidance will need to be supplemented by giving specific consideration to 
the nature of the case in hand vis-à-vis what exactly it takes for the threshold of the 
Aranyosi and Căldăra test to be met. For instance, a case concerning threats to 
judicial independence in a Member State is very different to one regarding a specific 
fundamental right violation occurring by an agent of a Member State (as was the case 
in Aranyosi and Căldăraru with regard to Article 4 of the Charter). Hence, although 
LM is not concerned with the breadth and scale of the Polish problem, it cannot ignore 
it either. One cannot help, for instance, but notice the practical challenges regarding 
the application of the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test to the facts of LM. What appears 
particularly difficult with utilising the test in the context of LM is the shifting of the 
burden of proof on the requested person. This equals to asking the individual 
                                                 
33
 LM judgment, para 71. 
34
 The CJEU mentioned that the issuing judicial authority shall produce upon request supplementary 
information and any objective material on any changes to the conditions for protecting the guarantee of 
judicial independence which may rule out the existence of that risk for the individual concerned.  See 
also Case C-220/18 PPU Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (2018) ECLI:EU:C:2018:589 with regard to 
information about the conditions in which the accused person would be incarcerated.  
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concerned to demonstrate that the judicial reforms in question have affected the 
independence of the judge who will conduct her/his own hearing whilst being 
ignorant about the identity of that judge.  
 
The CJEU was correct to tread carefully in the manner it confronted the Polish rule-
of-law drawback. In doing so, however, it placed a hard burden on national judges. 
Take for instance the process of an executing judge receiving assurances from an 
issuing court about the extent to which a systematic erosion of the rule of law in the 
Member State requesting the transfer was such as to mean that there was a strong risk 
the accused would not receive a fair trial. Such issuing court could in most cases 
either be corrupt or under political pressure from the backsliding government in 
question and therefore not in a position to provide any form of assurances (either 
present or future) as to its independence. Even if Polish courts were to provide 
assurances in the present case, one could argue that these were more likely to be 
smoke and mirrors than fact.  
 
At the same time, however, we need to consider that although judicial independence 
may be currently compromised in Poland, the judiciary is not a monolithic sector. 
Despite recent reforms, there may still be Polish courts that are independent. As such, 
executing judges need to be careful in their individual assessment not to be prejudiced 
against Poland in all situations. As the Advocate General rightly stressed in LM: ‘it 
cannot be ruled out that, in certain situations, the courts of that Member State are 
capable of hearing a case with the independence required by the second paragraph of 
Article 47 of the Charter.’35  
 
Beyond the above practical hurdles for national judges, the CJEU was successful in 
providing in LM an avenue by which national courts can protect the principle of 
judicial independence in light of evidence before them of another Member State’s 
systemic or generalised deficiencies. Having said that, certain details are yet to be 
clarified regarding the second limb of the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test. These include, 
for instance, the extent to which the transfer of a criminal suspect to the issuing 
Member State can be refused if there is a risk of the individual concerned suffering 
                                                 
35
 See AG Opinion, para 103. 
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inhuman or degrading treatment even if there is no proof of systemic or generalised 
deficiencies.36 Furthermore, while the CJEU has now established that the violation of 
a suspect’s right to fair trial can limit the execution of a EAW it did not establish that 
the same is true with reference to other rights protected by the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
 
A different point concerns the extent to which EU law can require Member States 
positively or proactively to facilitate further claims made by a criminal suspect which 
are linked to her original case. To use a current example, the compatibility with 
fundamental rights of the way systemic or generalised deficiencies manifest 
themselves in other prisons or courts in which the suspect may possibly be held after 
surrender or be sentenced at a later stage following her extradition fall exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the prisons and courts of the issuing Member State.37 Even if 
a national court therefore decides against the execution of a EAW based on an 
individual assessment, this may only partially protect a suspect’s fundamental rights. 
More issues will no doubt emerge in the course of future litigation and subsequent 
refinement of the individual test by the CJEU will be inevitable if not essential. 
 
B. Mutual recognition and fundamental rights protection 
 
While the execution of a EAW constitutes the default rule, refusal to execute such a 
warrant is intended to be an exception which must, on that basis, be interpreted 
strictly. The LM judgment clarifies the law pertaining to EU extradition procedure 
with regard to two issues: i) the interpretation of Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 
2002/584 on the EAW (Member States must respect fundamental rights as enshrined 
in Article 6 TEU as well as the principle of legality)38 and ii) the extent to which 
fundamental rights concerns can be taken into account and form a ground of non-
execution of a EAW.  
                                                 
36
 In Case C-578/16 PPU C.K. [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:127 the CJEU held in the context of the 
transfer of asylum seekers to another Member State that ‘even where there are no substantial grounds 
for believing that there are systemic flaws in the Member State responsible for examining the 
application for asylum, the transfer of an asylum seeker within the framework of Regulation 
No 604/2013 can take place only in conditions which exclude the possibility that that transfer might 
result in a real and proven risk of the person concerned suffering inhuman or degrading treatment, 
within the meaning of that article’ (para 98) 
37
 See Case C-220/18 PPU Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (2018) ECLI:EU:C:2018:589 
38
 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and 
surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L190/1). 
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The CJEU confirmed in LM that executing judicial authorities are entitled to refrain 
from giving effect to a EAW on account of blatant risks of breach of the fundamental 
right to a fair trial by the issuing state. The LM outcome is, therefore, decisive for the 
‘constitution’ of EU criminal law which is based on mutual recognition, the least 
contentious method for integration but one which nonetheless covers a wide range of 
judicial decisions in all stages of the criminal justice process.39 We shall note that 
Framework Decision 2002/584 was the first instrument in EU criminal law to be 
adopted following the principle of mutual recognition (as opposed to harmonisation). 
Simultaneously, it is an instrument which although augments judicial cooperation it 
touches upon a number of fundamental rights – vis-à-vis the rights of the accused 
subject to criminal proceedings and surrender within this framework. 
 
Indeed, the CJEU has historically restricted the avenues available for national courts 
to refuse to execute a EAW. Instead, it has given priority to the effectiveness of 
mutual recognition based on presumed mutual trust. The LM reasoning is therefore 
important because although the legality of the mutual recognition system established 
by the Framework Decision remains undisputed (as is its compatibility with 
fundamental rights)40 the judgment sees the CJEU setting the boundaries pertaining to 
the extent to which the EU can sustain an automatic system of recognition based 
solely on presumed trust. 
 
The literature on the principle of mutual recognition in EU criminal law is extensive 
and hence we are not going to delve into an analysis of its premises.41 Suffice to say 
                                                 
39
 See for a list of mutual recognition instruments compiled in 2017: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/29668/eu-instruments-in-the-field-of-criminal-law.pdf 
40
 See Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld [2007] ECR I-3633. Also in Melloni, the CJEU 
pronounced the primacy of EU law (i.e. the EAW Framework Decision as amended by Framework 
Decision 2009/299/JHA) vis-à-vis in absentia judgments and held that Article 4a(1) of the Framework 
Decision was compatible with Articles 47 and 48(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
41
 L Klimek, Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions in European Criminal Law (Springer Verlag, 
2017); W van Ballegooij, The Nature of Mutual Recognition in European Law: Re-examining the 
notion from an individual rights perspective with a view to its further development in the Criminal 
Justice Area’ (Intersentia, 2015); C Janssens, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the EU (Oxford 
University Press, 2013); K Lenaerts, ‘The principle of Mutual Recogntion in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’, University of Oxford, 30.01.2015. available from:  
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/the_principle_of_mutual_recognition_in_the_area_of_freed
om_judge_lenaerts.pdf 
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for the purpose of this annotation that, against the logic of establishing common 
substantive rules, mutual recognition generally depends upon the Member States’ 
tolerance of the diversity characterising national legal systems. It encourages 
cooperation between them through mutual trust and recognition of each other’s 
practices. Accordingly, the CJEU’s reference to the principles of mutual trust and 
mutual recognition in LM serves to highlight this fundamental premise based on 
Member States’ sharing of a set of common values on which the EU is founded 
(Article 2 TEU).42 In this context, the CJEU explains that national implementation of 
EU law in a Member State is based on the presumption that all other twenty-seven 
Member States comply with EU law (fundamental rights in particular). It implicitly 
recognises, however, that such a presumption is difficult to always sustain, especially 
in relation to maintaining a high level of mutual trust between the different actors 
which partake in the system.43  
 
While we mentioned earlier the role of precedent in the case law and its constraining 
force of the CJEU, the approach of the Court in LM sets new precedent vis-a-vis the 
limits that EU imposes to the EAW system. At first glance, LM can be read as a 
decision that contests the CJEU’s earlier findings starting with Radu (which 
concerned deprivation of liberty and forcible surrender of the suspect against Articles 
5 and 6 ECHR), where the Court appeared unconvinced that mutual recognition could 
be refused on fair trial grounds.44 The LM ruling also seems to be challenging the 
mutual recognition status quo of previous decisions such as Melloni (refusal to 
execute of a EAW request on fundamental rights grounds) and Jeremy F (possible 
right to an appeal suspending decisions which relate to the EAW) where the discretion 
left to Member States to protect fundamental rights was rather limited.45 While these 
cases are important points of reference with regard to the evolution of fundamental 
rights as a ground of non-execution of a EAW, we shall emphasise that they dealt 
with purported national law limits to the EAW; whereas the CJEU in LM is imposing 
                                                 
42
 LM judgment, Para 35-37. 
43
  See Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS and ME [2011] ECR I-13905 and the ECtHR’s 
decision in MSS v. Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, Judgment of 21 January 2011. 
44
 Case C-396/11 Radu (2011) ECLI:EU:C:2013:39. See for comment: E Xanthopoulou, ‘Radu 
judgment: a lost opportunity and a story of how mutual trust obsession shelved human rights’ KSLR 
EU law blog, 27.03.2013. Available from: 
https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=416#.XBt68i2cais 
45
 Case C-168/13 PPU Jeremy F (2013) ECLI:EU:C:2013:358 
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EU law limits to the EAW. This is perhaps one of the most important aspects of the 
decision which will no doubt be of particular interest to criminal lawyers.  
 
As such, it can be argued that despite the shortcomings surrounding the specification 
of the application of the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test, the CJEU’s formal recognition 
of fundamental rights as an EU law ground for non-execution of a EAW in LM is a 
welcome development. It both takes into account the post-Lisbon binding character of 
the Charter and relaxes the requirements of the EAW Framework Decision in 
producing a simplified and more effective system of surrender based on mutual 
recognition at all costs.46 National courts are invited to partake in monitoring the 
observance of the rights enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in their 
counterparts in specific cases. 47  Such a bottom-up scrutiny, often leading to a 
preliminary reference, may also require national judges to temporarily refuse the 
execution of a EAW and flee from the obligation to extradite both for the purpose of 
prosecution as well as for the execution of a custodial sentence by taking full account 
of the application of Lisbon’s human rights framework on the interpretation of the 
EAW.  
 
Having said that, while the CJEU explicitly recognised in LM that the violation of the 
right to a fair trial under Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
constitutes a ground of non-execution of a EAW, this is subject to two caveats. First, 
such an exception can only be used in exceptional circumstances. Second, only once 
such circumstances (e.g. a high threshold of systemic deficiency 48 ) have been 
established, limitations can be placed on the application of mutual recognition 
principles between Member States. As such, the LM ruling provides considerable 
                                                 
46
 We shall note that the discussion about the ‘uneasiness in the actual implementation of the mutual 
recognition scheme’ (see Fichera above, p. 168) vis-à-vis the grounds for refusal available in national 
law and the procedural divergence in the execution of the EAW between the European legal systems is 
hardly new and has been central in the relevant literature. See also T Konstadinides, ‘The 
Europeanisation of Extradition: How Many Light Years Away to Mutual Confidence?’ in C Eckes and 
T Konstadinides (eds.) Crime within the Area of Freedom Security and Justice: A European Public 
Order (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011), Chapter 7, pp.192-223. 
47
 This adds to the post-Lisbon Directive on the European Investigation Order has introduced an 
optional ground for non-recognition or non-execution: where there are substantial grounds to believe 
that the execution of the investigative measure indicated in the EIO would be incompatible with the 
executing state’s obligations under Art. 6 TEU and the Charter (Art. 11(1)(f)). Directive 2014/41/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation 
Order in criminal matters [2014] OJ L130/1 (1 May 2014). 
48
 See Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. (2011) ECLI:EU:C:2011:865.  
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opportunities for national courts but without going too far in allowing national judges 
to intervene on behalf of individual claimants suffering from a Member State’s 
systemic deficiencies. 
 
Interpreted in this manner, the CJEU avoided taking constitutional risks in LM while 
it indirectly contributed to addressing the problem caused by backsliding Member 
States. The decision does not seem to undermine the EU’s aspirations to forge a 
‘European criminal justice area’ based on mutual recognition. It compensates, 
however, for the lack of an EU specific legal basis / ground for refusal for 
fundamental rights breaches by issuing authorities, which for years left little choice to 
executing courts but to surrender criminal suspects. National judges had little choice 
to block the execution of a EAW even where the rights of the accused were not 
observed by the issuing state or where there was a high risk that they will be violated 
due to rule-of-law backsliding or other problems.49 In this respect, the LM outcome 
pays homage to another precedent, namely the N.S. ruling which concerned asylum 
law and fundamental rights violations in the operation of mutual recognition.50 Last, 
the CJEU’s approach in LM is somewhat sympathetic to the view taken in a number 
of Member States where non-compliance of surrender with fundamental rights 
constitutes an express ground of refusal in their national law implementing the EAW 
Framework Decision.51 
 
We shall not fail to mention that the principles emanating from the LM judgment are 
complementary to the existing grounds for non-execution of a EAW and guarantees 
                                                 
49
 Mitsilegas claims that ‘Non-compliance with fundamental rights is not, however, included as a 
ground to refuse to execute a European Arrest Warrant. Rather, the general provision of article 1(3) 
includes the general statement that ‘this Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the 
obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of 
the TEU’ See V Mitsilegas, ‘The principle of mutual recognition in EU criminal law in V Mitsilegas, 
M Bergstrom and T Konstadinides (eds.) Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law (Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar, 2016) 
50
 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. (2011) ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. See Case Report  by S 
Lieven (2011) 14 (2) European Journal of Migration Law 223. 
51
 On the implementation of the EAW Framework Decision, see Gisèle van Tiggelen, Anne 
Weyembergh and Laura Surano (eds), The Future of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters 
(Brussels, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009); and Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘The Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice from Amsterdam to Lisbon: Challenges of Implementation, 
Constitutionality and Fundamental Rights’ in Julia Laffranque (ed.), The Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, including Information Society Issues, Reports of the XXV FIDE Congress (Tallinn, 2012), 
vol. 3, pp. 21–142, and national Reports included therein. 
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inherent in Articles 3-5 and recitals 12, 13 of the Framework Decision which have 
been present since the inception of the EAW. It remains to see how the CJEU will 
balance the full effectiveness of mutual recognition mechanisms and the protection of 
the rights of the person concerned in an individualised case-by-case assessment of 
fundamental rights implications of the execution of a EAW, giving LM the power of 
precedent. 
 
C. The protection afforded to individuals in accordance with the principles of 
judicial independence and impartiality  
 
The CJEU confirmed that the fundamental right to a fair trial before an independent 
tribunal, is enshrined in Article 6(1) of the ECHR, a provision which corresponds to 
the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter.52 The CJEU interpreted judicial 
independence narrowly as the right of the accused to an independent court pertaining 
to the right to a fair trial (as opposed to the ability of a judge to decide a case free 
from government pressure).  Likewise, the CJEU provided an analogous account of 
the rules it considered to be inalienable to the guarantees of independence and 
impartiality.53   
 
In this respect, LM can be added to the line of case law inaugurated by Associação 
Sindical vis-à-vis the protection afforded to individuals in accordance with the 
principles of independence and impartiality.54 Having said that, we need to note that 
the reference in LM was framed differently to Associação Sindical which was a 
special case altogether dealing with the remuneration of judges in Portugal and its 
connection with judicial independence. While, therefore, in Associação Sindical the 
CJEU established that judicial independence derives from Articles 2, 4(3) and 19 
                                                 
52
 LM judgment, para 33 
53
 Ibid, paras 60-70 are particularly significant. The CJEU stressed that the requirement that courts be 
independent and impartial has two aspects: i) They need to exercise their functions wholly 
autonomously, shielded from external interventions or pressure, and ii) they need to be impartial, 
which entails maintaining an equal distance from the parties to the proceedings and their respective 
interests. We shall also note that the CJEU has held that the concept of judicial authority is an 
autonomous concept and not limited to courts but includes authorities charged with the administration 
of justice. See Case C-452/16 PPU Poltorak (2016) ECLI:EU:C:2016:858; Case C-477/16 PPU 
Kovalkovas (2016) ECLI:EU:C:2016:861. 
54
 Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses [2018] EU:C:2018:117. See for a detailed 
analysis: L Pech and S Platon, ‘Judicial independence under threat: The Court of Justice to the rescue 
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses’ (2018) 55 Common Market Law Review 1. 
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TEU, in LM the CJEU focused primarily on Article 47 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights as the source of judicial independence. It stressed that: 
 
The principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights 
under EU law, referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) 
TEU, is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in 
Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 
4 November 1950, and which is now reaffirmed by Article 47 of the 
Charter. The very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure 
compliance with EU law is of the essence of the rule of law.55 
 
The CJEU, therefore, connected judicial independence with effective judicial review 
and the right to an effective remedy before a court. The CJEU’s extension of the 
scope of application of the general principle of effective judicial protection to EU 
criminal law highlights further that this is a shared value between Member States also 
protected by Article 2 TEU. Mutual trust between Member States and their courts is 
based on this fundamental premise. The CJEU’s LM decision is therefore a reminder 
to Member States to take positive steps to maintain the high level of fundamental 
rights protection which will in turn help maintain a functioning system of mutual 
recognition.  
 
Apart from the adoption of legislation to protect fundamental rights, positive steps 
include national courts being forward about expressing concerns in future litigation 
concerning rule of law compliance in other Member States and opening channels of 
communication with their counterparts vis-à-vis the provision of supplementary 
information. Any further information provided by the issuing courts is important for 
executing judges in order to determine the foreseeability of breach of the fundamental 
right in question in relation to the concerned individual. As mentioned, this is perhaps 
easier done where the execution of a EAW relates to the conditions in which the 
criminal suspect is detained (i.e. that s/he will not suffer inhuman or degrading 
                                                 
55
 Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses [2018] EU:C:2018:117, paras 35, 36. 
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treatment) as opposed to a situation where the quality and independence of a Member 
State’s justice system as a whole is put into question.56  
 
What is more, the legacy of the LM decision is somewhat limited insofar as national 
courts still need to act in pursuance of recital 10 of the EAW Framework Decision 
and may by means of exception suspend a warrant in very limited circumstances.57 
More guidance is needed, for instance, by the CJEU on the length of postponement of 
a EAW execution or the extent to which a national judge may express her 
dissatisfaction with another State’s assurances about rectifying the situation. 58  To 
draw from the situation in LM, if Ireland chose to systematically refuse to extradite 
Mr Celmer (as opposed to postponing his extradition until the Polish authorities 
provided assurances that they rectified the situation59) this would amount to a breach 
of recital 10 of the Framework Decision60; the constitutional principle of mutual trust; 
and the principle of equality between Member States as laid down in Article 4 TEU.61 
In other words, Ireland would be the defaulting Member State. 
 
 
                                                 
56
  This was flagged up in Case C-220/18 PPU Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (2018) 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:589. Para 64: ‘Since the issue in the main proceedings is the execution of a specific 
EAW and not the quality of the issuing Member State’s prison system as a whole, I believe that, if the 
issuing Member State’s authorities make a commitment that the particular conditions in which the 
person sought will be detained do not entail a real risk that that person will suffer inhuman or 
degrading treatment, the executing judicial authority must attach to that commitment the significance 
which it deserves. As the expression of an obligation which has been formally assumed, if that 
commitment is breached, it may be relied on by the person sought before the judicial authority of the 
issuing Member State.’ 
57
 See paras 70-72 of the CJEU’s decision in LM which provided that the implementation of the EAW 
may only be suspended where a breach of Article 2 TEU has occurred – the determination of which 
falls to the European Council alone acting in accordance with Article 7 TEU. 
58
 As the CJEU stressed in Case C-220/18 PPU Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (2018) 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:589, para 81 ‘I say postpone and not refuse because the case-law established 
in Aranyosi does not mean inevitably that, if a risk of infringement of Article 4 of the Charter is 
identified which is not general and abstract but rather specific and personal, the executing judicial 
authority must refuse to allow the surrender of the person sought.’ 
59
 It, therefore, suffices in the post-LM world that the Polish government recently decided to retreat on 
forcing Supreme Court judges into early retirement. 
60
 Recital 10 of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant. OJ L190 18.7.2002: The mechanism of the EAW is based on a high level of confidence 
between Member States. Its implementation may be suspended only in the event of a serious and 
persistent breach by one of the Member States of the principles set out in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union, determined by the Council pursuant to Article 7(1) of the said Treaty with the 
consequences set out in Article 7(2) thereof. 
61
 Opinion of the Advocate General, para 99. The Advocate General also emphasised the importance of 
the executing court asking its counterpart issuing court for any supplementary information that can 
assist it in its decision to postpone. 
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D. Rule of Law Protection in the European Union 
 
The CJEU’s LM judgment can be characterised as a balancing act. One the one hand, 
there is evidence of self-restraint from the part of the CJEU acting within its sphere of 
competence. The CJEU abstains from taking the situation in its hands and acting as a 
rule of law enforcer by suspending all EAW requests from Poland in response to the 
Council’s Article 7 TEU ennui. One the other hand, the CJEU recognises its aptness 
to address a constitutional epidemic via legal means (as opposed to political) and 
tackle the wide and unchecked powers of the justice system in Poland – emphasising 
their inconsistency with those granted in a democratic state subject to the rule of 
law.62  
 
Certain commentators agreed prior to the LM judgment that ‘the Court might want to 
take the opportunity to send another signal to the Polish government that further 
attempts to undermine the independence of the judiciary would be subject to the 
scrutiny of Luxembourg.’63 This is what the CJEU did to a certain extent in LM by 
enabling executing judicial authorities and individual litigants to rely upon the 
European Commission’s Article 7 TEU rule of law probe in light of the serious 
deterioration of EU values in Poland. The CJEU did not undermine the Commission’s 
investigation. Far from it, it ‘added bite to Article 7 TEU’ by attributing to the 
Commission’s reasoned proposal (not a source of law in its own right) constitutional 
effects.64 
 
The LM case, as well as the separate legal cases opened pertaining to Polish reforms 
of the judiciary (including Commission v Poland65 and a preliminary reference made 
                                                 
62
 See LM judgment, para 22. 
63
 M Bonelli and M Claes, ‘Judicial serendipity: how Portuguese judges came to the rescue of the 
Polish judiciary’ (2018) 14 (3) European Constitutional Law Review 622. 
64
 A von Bogdandy et al, ‘Drawing Red Lines and Giving (Some) Bite – the CJEU’s Deficiencies 
Judgment on the European Rule of Law’, VerfBlog, 2018/8/03, https://verfassungsblog.de/drawing-
red-lines-and-giving-some-bite-the-cjeus-deficiencies-judgment-on-the-european-rule-of-law/ 
65
 Case C-619/18 R Commission v Poland (independence of Polish Supreme Court) (2018) 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:910. The Advocate General Opinion will come out on 11 April 2019. See also Joined 
cases C-585/18 C-624/18 C-625/18 (independence of Polish Supreme Court's disciplinary chamber) on 
19 March 2019. 
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by the Polish Supreme Court itself66) provide the CJEU with new possibilities for 
rule-of-law intervention. The fact that rule of law related cases increasingly find their 
way in the courtroom provides important ammunition for judges because neither a 
referring court nor the CJEU has competence to find a breach of the rule of law under 
the procedure provided for in Article 7 TEU. Beyond the limited competence of the 
CJEU under Article 7 TEU to review procedure (but not substance) there are 
noticeable difficulties in operationalising the political mechanism that Article 7 TEU 
establishes.67 As such, LM is significant as it initiates a process whereby the CJEU 
becomes actively involved in conserving the values and sustainability of Article 2 
TEU. As a result, rule of law enforcement gradually becomes a shared domain 
between the political and judicial institutions. 
 
Of course, it would be misleading to claim that the CJEU has had a spectator role in 
relation to the rule of law in Poland. So far it has been able to impliedly address rule 
of law related breaches in Poland in direct actions launched by the Commission for 
failure to fulfil its obligations under Article 258 TFEU. For instance, in the 
Białowieża Forest case, the CJEU justified the imposition of a fine on Poland in 
interim proceedings as a means to guarantee the effective application of EU law (the 
Habitats Directive 2013/17/EU and the Birds Directive 2009/147/EC), describing 
such application as ‘an essential component of the rule of law, a value enshrined in 
Article 2 TEU and on which the European Union is founded’.68 Here the rule of law 
terminology was used to reinforce Polish compliance with EU secondary legislation.  
 
LM is the next milestone in this process compensating for the slow political rule-of-
law enforcement pace. The CJEU connected the dots between political and juridical 
rule-of-law monitoring by supporting the Commission’s rule-of-law monitoring and 
warning against Poland. It confirmed that maintaining the independence of judicial 
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authorities (an issue which has been at the epicentre of the Article 7 TEU proceedings 
against Poland) is essential in order to ensure the effective judicial protection of 
individuals, including in the context of the execution of the EAW for the purpose of 
their prosecution or execution of a custodial sentence or detention order against them. 
 
 
The CJEU has therefore confirmed or, to put differently, constitutionalised the 
findings of the Commission and other international bodies with regard to Polish 
defiant attitude towards EU fundamental values. Not only did the CJEU abstained 
from calling the shots in LM, it also allowed sufficient space for national courts to 
determine whether the measures adopted by a counterpart Member State breach the 
rule of law. Commentators have not unanimously welcomed the CJEU’s approach. 
One annotation on the LM judgment noted that the CJEU could ‘go beyond its case 
law and frame the case primarily as a problem of rule of law’ ordering the overall 
suspension of EAW surrenders to Poland until it is satisfied that the problem is 
remedied.69 I disagree with this position, as it is obvious that such a solution would 
have not been compatible with the principle of conferral. Observance of the rule of 
law also includes the principle of conferral laid out in Article 5 (1) and (2) TEU 
which governs the competences of EU Institutions. The principle of loyalty in Article 
4 (3) TEU is also applicable to EU action, ensuring that EU Institutions are under a 
duty to show respect to the Member States when they exercise their powers under the 
Treaty.70   
 
We shall remind the reader that neither the Court nor the Commission have the 
competence in the Treaty to make a finding of a clear breach of the rule of law. Such 
competence lies in the political realm with the European Council having the last word 
– which as it known it is yet to take action.71 The LM ruling, therefore, indicates that 
the CJEU is acutely aware of its boundaries in finding systemic or generalised 
deficiencies in the Member States. It knows that the case raises primarily a problem of 
                                                 
69
 W van Ballegooij and P Bárd, ‘The CJEU in the Celmer case: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back 
for Upholding the Rule of Law Within the EU’, VerfBlog,2018/7/29, https://verfassungsblog.de/the-
cjeu-in-the-celmer-case-one-step-forward-two-steps-back-for-upholding-the-rule-of-law-within-the-eu 
70
 See T Konstadinides. The Rule of Law in the EU: The Internal Dimension (Hart Publishing, 2017), 
p.87; See also C Hillion, ‘Mixity and coherence: The significance of the duty of cooperation’ In: C 
Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds.) Mixed Agreements Revisited. (Hart Publishing, 2010) 
71
 Opinion of the Advocate General, para 102. 
Accepted version of forthcoming article in the CMLR – please do not cite without my permission 26
rule of law deficit in Poland. Yet, the CJEU appreciates that it has been asked a 
different question by the Irish High Court, the resolution of which would add a stone 
to fill the empty space leading up to the Polish problem.  
 
Whether or not LM will be remembered as a masterful manoeuvre from the CJEU to 
avoid criticism of centralisation or an act of good will to include domestic courts (or 
even shifting the burden on them) in rule-of-law enforcement remains to be seen. 
What is certain is that LM creates a tall order for some national judges who will be 
handed the task to discover systemic or generalised deficiencies in other Member 
States in order to protect individuals from unfair prosecution. As such, the CJEU’s 
guidance on the proper interpretation of EU law will be central in the course of 
infringement proceedings brought by the Commission against backsliding Member 
States or in preliminary ruling requests regarding concerns expressed by national 




Additional to the efforts of the EU political institutions to add substance to European 
values, the CJEU’s contribution is valuable in establishing that judicial independence 
is constitutionally protected as an essential component of the rule of law. The CJEU 
has gone beyond interpreting judicial independence as the ability of a judge to decide 
a case free from government pressure. It has confirmed in LM that judicial 
independence is imperative for the protection of fundamental rights within the EU 
legal order. At the same time, however, LM poses questions about the appropriateness 
of the test to assess systemic deficiencies in the Member States, the risks inflicted 
upon the principle of mutual recognition caused by the review of jurisdiction of 
another Member State as well as the CJEU’s mandate to protect the rule of law. 
 
With reference to the test to assess systemic deficiencies in the Member States, the 
CJEU confronted some of the challenges inherent in the mutual recognition 
presumption that dominates EU criminal justice. In balancing the compatibility of 
mutual recognition and fundamental rights protection, the CJEU ensured that mutual 
trust is not applied automatically and blindly. At the same time the question stands as 
to whether executing courts will progressively discontinue surrendering criminal 
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suspects to the issuing authorities of other Member States as a result of the ‘real risk’ 
and ‘substantive grounds’ test applied by the CJEU. 
 
Indeed the CJEU placed the onus on national courts to determine the modalities of 
horizontal judicial cooperation in case of systemic or generalised deficiencies in the 
issuing state. Yet, the application of the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test may prove 
problematic in practice where, as in the LM case, the executing authorities of a 
Member State aspire to protect a suspect because of a rule of law crisis that has been 
taking place in the issuing state but are not entirely convinced with the results of their 
investigation regarding the substantial issues of a case. Following the LM preliminary 
ruling, Ms Justice Donnelly of the Irish High Court ordered that the extradition of Mr 
Celmer takes place. She concluded that there was no real risk that Mr Celmer would 
face a ‘flagrant denial of his right to a fair trial’ on surrender to Poland.72 It is worth 
noting that the Irish High Court emphasised that the case was being made by 
reference to the test of ‘flagrant denial’ and remarked that any diversion from that 
standard would have been highlighted in the CJEU’s judgment. 73  Following the 
judgment of the Irish High Court, Mr Celmer sought leave to appeal the order for his 
extradition to Poland. He was granted leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of 
Ireland in December 2018 and his case is pending judgment.74 
  
Perhaps more often than anticipated by the CJEU we are going to see executing 
courts’ decisions appealed by individuals in higher national courts which may in turn 
seek a preliminary ruling from the Court. National judges will be asking the CJEU 
about the permissible level of deviation allowed from the principle of mutual 
recognition in light of the evidence of deficiencies they have in front of them. They 
will then apply the CJEU’s preliminary ruling to the facts of the case which will 
confirm the extent to which a criminal suspect’s fundamental rights can be protected 
vis-à-vis the authority to which she is subjected.   
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Given the above, can we be certain that the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test brings 
national judges closer to the EU law enforcement landscape? As a commentator puts 
it: ‘at least some questions arising after the Aranyosi decision have been answered’ 
with regard to the use of the Charter’s provisions to refrain from executing a EAW. 
Yet, in their quest for supplementary information from their counterparts in another 
Member State about the state of fundamental rights protection as well as any 
guarantees for the individual national judges will be confronted with embarrassing 
situations. Inter alia, they will sometimes find themselves asking their European 
counterparts whether they are ‘independent’. Furthermore, the newly acquired power 
of supervision offered to national judges cannot preclude cases in which the ‘non-
independent’ Polish judges may decide to temporarily block the execution of a EAW 
where the suspect in question is refusing to be extradited from Poland to another 
Member State in which laws are not equally enforced and independently adjudicated.  
 
Surely, one can think of numerous worst-case scenarios where the CJEU may come to 
regret the contribution of the LM decision on the existence of additional grounds for 
non-execution of a EAW. Indeed, the fine details of conducting an individual and 
specific assessment of the concrete risks in each case can be refined. As explained, 
what constitutes a ‘blatant risk’ can be easy to ascertain for the executing judge when 
the EU political institutions have conducted a rule-of-law investigation against the 
requesting state, as it was the case in LM in relation to Poland.  But is the CJEU ready 
to draw parallels with the ECtHR’s findings in Tarakhel (regarding the importance of 
ensuring fundamental rights in the Dublin system) in a case where generalised 
systemic deficiencies in the issuing state have not been first ascertained by the EU 
Institutions?75 Like the LM ruling, more cases will be returned to Member States for 
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an assessment of the merits, and there are going to be more extradition proceedings in 
the Member States where similar issues will emerge. 
 
Some of these cases will eventually find their way to the ECtHR when all appeals 
before national courts have been exhausted. Like in Tarakhel, the ECtHR would be 
able to assess whether the practice and interpretation of the EAW by a Contracting 
party is in line with the ECHR. Despite future applicants presenting a strong case, the 
ECtHR may adopt a stricter stance where contrary to Tarakhel the applicants’ special 
vulnerability threshold is low. We shall highlight that although the ECtHR confirmed 
that a softer obligation lays on Member States in cases in which the risk of 
fundamental rights breaches is not proven by the general situation in the concerned 
Member State, it paid particular attention on the applicants’ individual circumstances 
and efficacy of assurances applying in the context of removals to Member States. 
Hence, the ECtHR’s interpretation ensures compliance with the principle of mutual 
recognition (as it does with the principle of non-refoulement). Last, the ECtHR’s 
attitude of deference to national decision-makers, which often comes at the expense of 
the rights at issue, has hardly changed as a result of Tarakhel.76 Hence, one might 
wonder whether Member States will comply and fulfil their human rights obligations 
in the context of asylum or extradition as a result of the case law of the ECtHR.  
 
Moving on to consider the risks inflicted upon the principle of mutual recognition 
caused by the review of jurisdiction of another Member State, even though the 
divergent practice regarding trial and detention in different Member States undermine 
the CJEU’s mutual recognition principle, it is doubted that the CJEU will in future 
deny its significance as the cornerstone of EU criminal law. Since its 
constitutionalisation by the Lisbon Treaty, mutual recognition is here to stay and 
define the conduct of Member States in the majority of criminal cases given that 
certain preconditions are met. Mrs Justice Donnely’s post-LM judgment confirms this 
position although it was doubtful that Poland was fulfilling its human rights 
obligations. She stressed that the facts of Celmer did not reach the ‘high threshold’ 
necessary to prevent his surrender to Poland in accordance with the principles laid 
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down by the CJEU.77 This was notwithstanding the earlier finding of the Irish High 
Court of the existence of generalised and systemic violations to the independence of 
Poland’s judiciary.78  
 
Last, as regards the CJEU’s mandate to protect the rule of law, the LM judgment is 
symbolic that the development of the EU rule of law’s application in practice has 
been led not merely by legislative development but also by the CJEU in its 
jurisprudence beginning with Les Verts and developed thereafter, most recently in 
cases like Associação Sindical. Enabling the CJEU to offer its own perspective on the 
matter, however reticently, carries considerable practical significance. 
Compartmentalising the problems in Poland and addressing specific EU law breaches 
through the lenses of fundamental rights adds to the existing arsenal available to the 
EU Institutions under Article 258 TFEU and Article 7 TEU to enforce the rule of law 
in backsliding Member States. Moreover, by elevating effective judicial protection of 
individuals’ rights under EU law referred to in Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of 
the Charter, the CJEU is taking ownership of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Not only does it solidify its reputation as a fundamental rights court but it also 
empowers individuals to defend common values which are gradually becoming 
uncommon in some Member States. The LM decision is a small victory, but a victory 
nonetheless especially in raising awareness about systemic fair trial issues in the 
Member States and placing weight on diplomatic assurances which guarantee fair trial 
rights. 
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